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the question whether EU free movement law protected 
a shipping firm wishing to reflag one of its vessels, the 
Rosella, from the Finnish flag to that of Estonia from 
collective action by labour unions aimed at deterring 
corporate migration. The potential losers: Finnish work-
ers. The potential winners: corporate interests seeking 
lower costs, and Estonian workers. In the longer term, 
the balancing of winners and losers invites assessment 
of the type of internal market that is being built: free-
dom to trade? freedom to act collectively to compete 
effectively against corporate power? Laval had many 
similarities and some differences, and arose out of 
action by Swedish labour unions aimed at blockading 
worksites owned by Laval, a Latvian company which 
was employing workers posted to Sweden from Latvia 
who were not subject to the relatively generous terms 
and conditions enjoyed by Swedish workers. 
 The unions are private parties, not public bod-
ies, but the Court has long taken the view that such 
entities are subject to the Treaty rules governing the 
free movement of persons, including companies. It 
did not deviate from that approach. Nor did it find a 
way to exclude the collective action from the scope of 
the Treaty on the basis that the EU lacks legislative 
competence in regard to the right of association and 
the right to strike (see now Article 153(5) TFEU). The 
rules of free movement apply even in areas where the 
EU’s legislative reach is exhausted: here too the Court 
was following its own orthodox approach. This left the 
Court to conclude that it was dealing with a restriction 
on cross-border economic activity. What mattered was 
whether the restrictive effects of the collective labour 
action were justified. And here the Court was breaking 
new ground. Although it had in the past dealt with cases 
pitting fundamental economic rights against fundamen-
tal social and political rights – such as Schmidberger 
v Austria (Case C-112/00 [2003] ECR I-5659) in which 
it held that, given the the importance of freedom of 
expression, there was no violation of EU law where 
environmental protests blocked the motorway though 
the Brenner Pass to the detriment of cross-border trade 
– it had never before addressed the need to reconcile 
fundamental (but not absolute) rights in the context of 
labour disputes. And it was forced to do so without any 
helpful map or priority list in the Treaty (NicShuibhne 
2009). 
 Corporate mobility or protecting the rights of 
(Scandinavian) workers? The Court accepted in prin-
ciple that the right to take collective action to protect 
workers is a legitimate interest which justifies a restric-
tion of economic freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. 
It added that the Community, now Union, has ‘not only 
an economic but also a social purpose’ (para 79 Viking 
Line, para 105 Laval). But who actually wins? This is 
ultimately a matter for the national court before which 
the litigation had been initiated but the Court of Justice 
in Viking Line explained that that court must ascertain 
whether the objectives pursued by means of the collec-
tive action concern the protection of workers; and that 
‘even if that action – aimed at protecting the jobs and 
conditions of employment of the members of that union 
liable to be adversely affected by the reflagging of the 
Rosella – could reasonably be considered to fall, at first 
sight, within the objective of protecting workers, such a 
view would no longer be tenable if it were established 
that the jobs or conditions of employment at issue were 
not jeopardised or under serious threat’. 
 If this test means that it must be checked in the 
particular circumstances of this case whether the col-
lective action is apt to achieve its stated ends of protect-
ing workers’ jobs and employment conditions, then the 
judgment is relatively narrow in its impact – although 
even here the required assessment of whether the ac-
tion does not go beyond what is necessary to attain its 
objective is awkward and promises unpredictability. If, 
by contrast, the ruling means that only action aimed at 
protecting the jobs of union members is recognised as 
capable of being justified under EU law, then the Court 
has excluded the possibility of more long-term strategic 
action taken by unions and even the ‘political strike’ in 
so far as it impedes cross-border economic activity. 
That constitutes a dramatic incursion into the permitted 
scope of collective labour rights.
 The ambiguity of the Court’s judgment is trou-
bling. It empowers actors at national level seeking to 
propel reform of the ‘social partnership’ to the benefit of 
employer interests: it is likely to place a deterrent effect 
on collective labour action. All the more so because of 
the risk that if action is found to be unlawful, the union 
may be liable to pay compensation to commercial op-
erators whose business has been caused harm: exactly 
this occurred as a result of a subsequent ruling of a 
Swedish court in the Laval litigation, in which it was 
concluded that discrimination had been suffered by the 
Latvian company because of Swedish refusal to take 
account of collective agreements applicable in Latvia 
(Reich 2010). The litigation in Viking Line itself was 
settled out of court shortly after the Court’s judgment, 
but the consequence was a general anxiety that the 
Court had stumbled into the shaping of collective labour 
law and policy, an area in which it has little expertise 
and in which it has adopted a test which significantly 
favours corporate interests over worker protection (Da-
vies 2008; Azoulai 2008; Barnard 2009). The critiques 
have covered not only outcome but purpose: to weigh 
matters of social constitutional law against economic 
considerations goes beyond the democratic failure of 
nation states against which free movement law is cor-
rectly targeted and asserts, beyond the proper scope of 
the Treaty, a setting aside of locally determined welfarist 
choices (Joerges and Rödl 2009).
 In the ‘older’ Member States in particular the rulings 
generated high levels of hostility from labour unions and 
those with political concern to be seen to protect such 
interests: although voices from Central and Eastern Eu-
rope occasionally observed that ‘this is why we joined’. 
But the law, before the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, rests heavily on the justification entertained by 
the Court for such practices.
 The storm that devastated the Treaty establish-
ing a Constitution was in part whipped up by anxiety 
about the perceived destructive effect of unfettered 
competition. In France, in particular, the fear of the 
‘Polish plumber’ arriving to steal French jobs (and, 
rarely was it added, to offer French consumers a more 
competitive market, thereby to stimulate economic 
growth and create more jobs) was a factor in the ‘No’ 
referendum vote of 2005. Viking Line and Laval fanned 
the flames. Adjusting the image of the EU’s purpose 
was a key political aim in negotiating what became 
the Treaty of Lisbon – not least in order to prepare an 
excuse for withholding any opportunity for a further 
national referendum (except in Ireland).
 The Treaty now commits the Union to inter alia a 
‘social market’ (Article 3(3) TEU). Before the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 it was 
provided that the activities of the EC shall include ‘a 
system ensuring that competition in the internal market 
is not distorted.’ Now, post-Lisbon, Article 2 EU provides 
only that ’The Union shall establish an internal market’. 
The commitment to ‘a system ensuring that competi-
tion is not distorted’ has been relegated to a Protocol 
attached to the Treaties. Article 28 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights provides inter alia that workers 
have the right to take collective action to defend their 
interests, including strike action – and, as a result of 
the Lisbon Treaty, this is now a binding provision.
So does this mean the EU has shifted its focus? Is it 
no longer so aggressively ‘economic’?
 With particular reference to Viking Line and 
Laval is collective labour action now protected, even 
where it impedes cross-border activity? No. The Lisbon 
alterations alter the tone of the Treaty, but the Member 
States were not able to agree definitively to change the 
heartland of the law of the internal market. Clearly, were 
one seeking to defend the (trade-restrictive) expression 
of social and political freedom before the Court, one 
would now argue that post-Lisbon the emphasis has 
shifted: the rise of the ‘social market’ and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the relegation of the com-
mitment to undistorted competition all lend support to 
 
EU Law After Lisbon: Taking Stock1
Guest Editor- Daniel Halberstam
 Daniel Halberstam is the Eric Stein Collegiate 
Professor of Law and Director of the European Legal 
Studies Program at the University of Michigan.  He is 
also Professor of Law in the European Legal Stud-
ies Department at the College of Europe, Bruges. 
A graduate of Columbia College (mathematics) and 
Yale Law School, he served as clerk to Justice David 
Souter (U.S. Supreme Court) and as judicial fellow for 
Judge Peter Jann (European Court of Justice).  Hal-
berstam has written widely on comparative federalism, 
European integration, and constitutional pluralism.  He 
has lectured throughout Europe and serves on several 
academic advisory boards, including the Common Mar-
ket Law Review, Cambridge Studies in European Law 
and Policy (Cambridge Univ. Press), the Max Planck 
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Whose internal market? 
Companies’ or Workers’, Judges’ or Politicians’ 
Stephen Weatherill
 The December 2007 rulings of the Grand 
Chamber of the Court of Justice in Viking Line (Case 
C-438/05 [2007] ECR I-10779) and Laval (Case 
C-341/05 [2007] ECR I-11767) reveal much about the 
internal market as an exercise in deregulation and 
economic freedom. So much so that, for those engaged 
in protecting the interests of workers in the ‘old’ Mem-
ber States, the decisions have become shorthand for 
all that is wrong with the EU project. More than three 
years and a notoriously evasive revision of the Treaties 
later, the rulings continue to provide ample proof of the 
frequently insuperable difficulty in the EU of replacing 
judicial interpretation of the meaning of the Treaty by 
political choices.
 Viking Line, stripped down to its core, involved 
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the claim that pursuit of economic freedom has been 
legally braked. But the Treaty provisions on free move-
ment have not been changed: undistorted competition 
is a commitment found now only in a Protocol, but a 
Protocol is legally binding. Although there is scope for 
the Court to adopt an adjusted interpretation of the 
free movement rules which gives greater weight to 
justification of practices that tend to inhibit cross-border 
commercial activity, the Lisbon reforms are too legally 
‘soft’ to require that outcome (Semmelmann 2010). 
Barnard’s contribution to this issue offers comparable 
assessment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, con-
verted by Lisbon into a legally binding instrument: it may 
achieve a re-balancing of priorities with consequences 
sympathetic to social protection but such an impact is 
far from guaranteed.  Ultimately the Court continues to 
enjoy a great degree of interpretative autonomy.
 The process of Treaty revision is in principle 
able to set aside decisions of the Court about the in-
terpretation of Treaty provisions. But this very rarely 
happens because it requires all 27 Member States to 
sign up to the change. It’s a familiar story: the famous 
Bosman ruling, applying free movement law to sport 
(Case C-415/93) [1995] ECR I-4921), has been bitterly 
attacked but never set aside because there is no una-
nimity among the 27 Member States about its alleged 
pernicious effects. And, after Viking Line and Laval, 
for all the bullying perpetrated by some of the ‘older’ 
Member States,  especially France, there was never 
any likelihood of the Central and Eastern European 
states surrendering the competitive advantage  of their 
low-cost economies by agreeing to insulate the econo-
mies of the older Member States from the (admittedly 
ambiguous) disciplining effect of the law of the internal 
market. And so the Lisbon Treaty reforms merely nod 
to the fear of the migrant Polish plumber but do not 
definitively change her legal position. 
 The tension between trading freedom and col-
lective labour rights endures post-Lisbon: Viking Line 
and Laval remain high-profile. The ‘Monti report’ of 
May 2010 – A New Strategy for the Single Market: at 
the service of Europe’s Economy and Society (Monti 
2010) - states that: ‘There is a broad awareness among 
policy makers that a clarification ... should not be left to 
future occasional litigation before the ECJ or national 
courts. Political forces have to engage in a search for a 
solution, in line with the Treaty objective [Art 3(3) TEU] 
of a social market economy’. This seems initially ap-
pealing – and yet what sort of solution might be thought 
politically acceptable? The subsequent Commission 
Communication issued in October 2010 (Commission 
2010) declares that ‘Economic freedoms and freedoms 
of collective action must be reconciled’, and advises 
that likely ‘clarification of the exercise of fundamental 
social rights within the context of the economic free-
doms of the single market’ can be expected in 2011. 
But it seems highly improbable that a ‘solution’ can be 
extracted through the political process. Even granted 
a background broad political consensus and an ability 
to navigate past the obstacles created by the Court’s 
interpretation of the Treaty, it would be fiendishly dif-
ficult to draft a legislative text of a sufficiently concrete 
nature to prove operationally useful in resolving these 
collisions between economic rights and political and 
social interests. And in the EU there is in any event no 
such consensus: the interests of the Member States 
with relatively lightly regulated, low-wage economies 
diverge sharply from those with heavier and more costly 
regulatory environments. It is hard to expect much more 
than platitudes and legislative tinkering to emerge from 
political negotiation. The Services Directive (Directive 
2006/123) offers a notorious example of how deep 
political disagreement tends to generate legislative 
texts strewn with sectoral exclusions, evasion of prin-
ciple and deliberate textual ambiguity (Barnard 2008, 
Hatzopoulos 2007). By agreeing laws of this imprecise 
type politicians delegate power to judges. And therefore 
the Court’s interpretative choices retain deep political 
significance in the shaping of the internal market.
Stephen Weatherill, Law Faculty & Somerville 
College, University of Oxford
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The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
Happy 10th Birthday?
Catherine Barnard
1.  Introduction
 The EU Charter has been greeted with brickbats 
and bouquets. The bouquets come largely from interest 
groups who see it both as an important way of reigning 
in the excesses of the EU as its competence expands 
to areas as diverse as immigration, asylum and police 
cooperation, and as a potentially dynamic tool to chal-
lenge existing EU law.1 The brickbats come from the 
awkward squad states with a dominant Eurosceptic 
press (UK, Poland and the Czech Republic) who (incor-
rectly) see the Charter as bringing in new laws which 
would destroy jobs’2 and affecting ‘policies on abortion, 
immigration and public services and forc[ing] an end to 
the ban on secondary picketing in industrial disputes.’3 
As a result, when negotiating the IGC mandate for the 
Lisbon Treaty, one of the UK government’s ‘red lines’ 
was to protect the UK from the consequences of the 
change of status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.4 
The principal and most public demonstration of this de-
sire was the adoption of what became Protocol 30 on 
the application of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom, 
referred to in the (probably incorrect) short-hand as the 
‘opt-out’. 
 The aim of this contribution is to provide a brief 
assessment of the Charter ten years after its original 
adoption and just over a year after it came into force: 
how has it be used to date, what effect does Protocol 
30 have, and what are the prospects for the future?
2. The Charter
 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, first 
solemnly proclaimed in December 2000, was intended 
to make existing fundamental rights more visible.5 
Based on, variously, the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, the Community Social Charter 1989 and 
the Council of Europe’s Social Charter 1961, as well 
as the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, the Charter was intended to codify – and act as 
a showcase for - existing rights. It was not intended to 
create new rights.6 Although not initially legally binding, 
it was nevertheless regularly referred to in the pre-
Lisbon period by the Advocates-General, the General 
Court and, latterly, by the Court of Justice to reinforce 
the interpretation of existing provisions of EU law.7 
 The legal position of the Charter was changed 
by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 6(1) TEU says the Charter 
has ‘same legal value as the Treaties’. In other words, it 
forms part of the primary law of the EU, with the result 
that its provisions have legal effect and can be enforced 
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before the European Court of Justice, as well as before 
the national courts when Union law issues are at stake. 
This has given rise to a number of concerns, especially 
in the UK.
 What, then, is the nature of these concerns? 
The Charter includes social and economic rights in 
the same document as civil and political rights.8 This is 
unusual in international human rights instruments. Gen-
erally, the two groups of rights are placed in separate 
documents due to the (contested) argument that while 
civil and political rights are essentially negative and so 
do not require state resources, economic and social 
rights are positive and do. While the UK is prepared to 
accept that traditional civil and political rights are rights 
(eg Article 2 ‘Everyone has the right to life’, Article 11 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression’), it 
is concerned about the potential budgetary implica-
tions of the economic and social rights. It is particularly 
worried about the implications of the Solidarity Title 
(where the economic and social rights are predomi-
nantly located), in particular Article 28 on the right to 
strike, for UK law. The UK has therefore argued that 
the economic and social rights, are not actually ‘rights’ 
but ‘principles’ which are not intended to be justiciable 
(ie they cannot be relied on directly before the courts). 
The UK secured an amendment to the Charter at the 
time of the Constitutional Treaty to make this clear: as 
Article 52(5) now puts it, the provisions of the Charter 
containing principles ‘may be implemented by legisla-
tive and executive acts’ of the Union and the Member 
States when implementing Union law. Such provisions 
‘shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation 
of such acts and in the ruling on their legality’. In other 
words principles will not be directly effective in the na-
tional courts. 
 However, the stumbling block remains that the 
Charter does not identify which provisions contain rights 
and which principles. The revised explanations accom-
panying the Charter - ‘drawn up as a way of providing 
guidance in the interpretation of this Charter’ and which 
must be ‘given due regard by the court of the Union and 
of the Member States’9 - were intended to address this 
problem. They give examples of principles, drawn from 
the Solidarity Title of the Charter, including Article 25 
on the rights of the elderly (‘The Union recognises and 
respects the rights of the elderly to lead a life of dignity 
and independence and to participate in social and cul-
tural life’), Article 26 on the integration of persons with 
disabilities and Article 37 on environmental protection. 
 Confusingly, the explanations also state that 
some articles may contain elements of rights and 
principles, such as Article 23 on equality between men 
and women, Article 33 on family and professional life 
and Article 34 on social security and social assistance 
(Articles 33 and 34 are in the Solidarity Title). Therefore, 
this suggests that some social and economic rights 
will not be mere principles but may in fact give rise to 
justiciable rights,10 a view confirmed by the (pre-Lisbon) 
decision of the Court of Justice in Viking.11 As Weatherill 
discusses in this journal, the case concerned strike action 
which interfered with freedom of establishment under 
Article 49 TFEU. The Court, referring to Article 28 of the 
Charter on the ‘right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements … and to take collective action to defend 
[the] interests [of workers], including strike action’, said 
the right to strike is a ‘fundamental right which forms an 
integral part of the general principles of law’ (emphasis 
added). As we shall see below, concerns that the Soli-
darity Title might include rights, and not just principles, 
influenced the drafting of the UK/Poland Protocol No. 30. 
Before considering the Protocol, we need to consider the 
scope of application of the Charter.
3. To whom/what does the Charter Apply?
 Article 51(1) of the Charter says the Charter 
applies firstly to the institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies of the Union, with due regard for the principle 
of subsidiarity. It also applies to the Member States but 
only when they are implementing Union law, a point 
emphasized by the Czech Republic in its (non-binding) 
Declaration on the Charter. This says ‘The Czech 
Republic stresses that [the Charter’s] provisions are 
addressed to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law, and not when they are adopt-
ing and implementing national law independently from 
Union law.’12 In other words, purely national issues will 
not be affected by the Charter.13
 The meaning of Article 51(1) is – to an extent 
- clarified in the explanations:14 Article 51 ‘seeks to es-
tablish clearly that the Charter applies primarily to the 
institutions and bodies of the Union, in compliance with 
the principle of subsidiarity’.15 The institutions include 
the European Court of Justice. This raises the tantaliz-
ing prospect that the Charter, drafted primarily to gov-
ern vertical relationships (individual v. EU, individual v. 
Member State), might acquire some quasi-horizontal or 
indirect effect (individual v. individual)16 through judicial 
interpretation (see eg Kücükdeveci17). Kücükdeveci, a 
case concerning a private sector employer discriminat-
ing against his employee on the grounds of age, also 
appears to suggest that general principles of law may 
have some form of horizontal effect, at least in so far 
as they can be used to disapply conflicting provisions 
of national law, and, as Article 6(3) TEU makes clear, 
fundamental rights are general principles of law. 18 The 
general principles may thus be broader in their field of 
application than the Charter.
 The significance of the fact that the actions 
of the EU institutions are subject to review under the 
Charter has already been felt. In McB,19 the Court con-
sidered in detail whether the orthodox interpretation of 
the Brussels II bis Regulation 2201/200320 should be 
reconsidered in the light of the Charter, albeit that it 
ultimately concluded that the Charter did not affect the 
Regulation’s interpretation. In Volker and Schecke21 
the Court went further. The case concerned an EU 
Regulation requiring individuals to agree that, in order 
to receive money from EU agricultural funds, their 
name, address and the amounts they receive had to be 
recorded on a publicly accessible website. In a robust 
retort to its critics that it doesn’t take rights seriously,22 
the Court used the Charter to strike down the Regulation 
for its incompatibility with an individual’s fundamental 
right to privacy, in part because the Council and Com-
mission had failed to consider whether there were any 
less restrictive alternatives to achieve the objective of 
transparency.
 While the Charter applies ‘primarily’ to the EU 
institutions, it also applies to the Member States but, 
apparently, only when ‘implementing’ EU law. This has 
prompted some controversy: according to the case 
law of the Court, general principles of law (which, as 
we have seen, include fundamental rights) apply when 
Member States implement (Wachauf23), derogate 
(ERT24), and, more generally, act within the scope of 
(Annibaldi25) EU law. Does this mean that the Charter 
is limiting the earlier case law? The general view is not, 
not least because the explanations add: ‘As regards 
the Member States, it follows unambiguously from the 
case-law of the Court of Justice that the requirement 
to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of 
the Union is only binding on the Member States when 
they act in the scope of Union law’ (citing the very cases 
Wachauf; ERT and Annibaldi).26  If the Charter is meant 
to be a clarification of the existing law, then the term 
‘implementing’ would cover the two broader uses.27 
And even if the Charter applies only to Member States 
when implementing EU law, in the narrow sense, this 
may not matter as much as would first appears due to 
the continued role of general principles of European 
Union law, principles first developed by the Court and 
now given Treaty recognition, which will apply in this 
situation. 
4. Does the Charter expand the EU’s competence?
 During its drafting, a number of states were 
concerned about the Charter being used as a Trojan 
horse to expand the EU’s competence to legislate. The 
horizontal provisions found in Title VII of the Charter try 
to reassure the Member States. The second sentence 
of Article 51(1) provides that the Union institutions and 
the Member Sates must ‘respect the rights, observe 
the principles and promote the application thereof in 
accordance with their respective powers and respecting 
the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it 
in the Treaties’. In addition, Article 51(2) provides that 
‘The Charter does not extend the field of application of 
Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish 
any new power or task for the Union, or modify pow-
ers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.’28 This careful 
ring-fencing of competence in Title VII of the Charter 
had satisfied the UK since there is no reference to it 
in Protocol No.30. The Czech Republic and Poland 
were less certain. In its Declaration on the Charter, the 
Czech Republic emphasises: that the Charter does not 
extend the field of application of Union law and does 
not establish any new power for the Union. It does not 
diminish the field of application of national law and does 
not restrain any current powers of the national authori-
ties in this field.29
 Poland was also keen to ensure that the Charter 
did not curtail its right to legislate. Its Declaration says:
The Charter does not affect in any way the right 
of Member States to legislate in the sphere of 
public morality, family law, as well as the pro-
tection of human dignity and respect for human 
physical and moral integrity.
This raises the question as to the nature and function 
of Protocol No 30 for the UK and Poland (soon to be 
joined by the Czech Republic at the next Accession). 
5. The non-opt-out opt-out
 The original intention behind Protocol 30 was to 
‘clarify the application of the Charter’.30 It was therefore 
meant to be a document which all the Member States 
could sign up to. In the event, only Poland and the UK 
agreed to it. The Protocol thus promptly assumed the 
look of an ‘opt-out’, a view reinforced by the then Prime 
Minster’s statement in Parliament that ‘It is absolutely 
clear that we have an opt-out from both the charter 
and judicial and home affairs.’31 Yet, if Protocol 30 is 
compared with other genuine ‘opt-outs’, such as the 
UK/Denmark opt-out from EMU, it looks nothing like it. 
So what does Protocol 30 do?
The clarificatory nature of the Protocol can best be seen 
by looking at Article 1(1):
The Charter does not extend the ability of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, or 
any court or tribunal of Poland or of the United 
Kingdom, to find that the laws, regulations or 
administrative provisions, practices or action of 
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Poland or of the United Kingdom are inconsis-
tent with the fundamental rights, freedoms and 
principles that it reaffirms.32 
 This provision, when read in conjunction with 
the Preamble (‘Whereas the Charter reaffirms the rights 
freedoms and principles recognised by the Union and 
makes those rights more visible, but does not create 
new rights or principles’), appears to suggest that since 
the Charter is simply a reaffirmation of the previous 
law, it will apply to the UK and Poland. In other words, 
to the extent that the Charter is merely a restatement 
of the existing law, then the Protocol is not an opt-out 
and the Charter will apply to the UK/Poland. This view 
is reinforced by the existence of Article 1(2) of the Pro-
tocol (see below) as well as the fact that Article 2 of the 
Protocol provides that ‘To the extent that a provision 
of the Charter refers to national laws and practices, 
it shall only apply to Poland or the United Kingdom to 
the extent that the rights or principles that it contains 
are recognised in the law or practices of Poland or of 
the United Kingdom’. Both Article 1(2) and 2 proceed 
on the assumption that the Charter will apply to the UK 
and Poland.33
 The fact that the Protocol is not an opt-out is 
further confirmed in public statements made first by 
the Labour, and now by the Coalition, government. For 
example, in its evidence to the House of Lords Select 
Committee, the Department of Work and Pensions’ 
(DWP) said that ‘The UK Protocol does not constitute 
an “opt-out”. It puts beyond doubt the legal position 
that nothing in the Charter creates any new rights, or 
extends the ability of any court to strike down UK law’.34 
More significantly, the UK’s lawyers told the Court of 
Appeal in Saaedi35 in 2010 that:
the Secretary of State accepts, in principle, that 
fundamental rights set out in the Charter can 
be relied on as against the UK, and submits 
that [Cranston J, the first instance judge] erred 
in holding otherwise. … The purpose of the 
Charter protocol is not to prevent the Charter 
from applying to the United Kingdom, but to 
explain its effect. 
All this seems pretty conclusive: Protocol 30 is not ap-
parently an opt-out. 
 But is there any wriggle room for the UK/Poland 
to argue that in extremis, Protocol 30 does provide an 
opt-out. There are two possibilities. The first is derived 
from an a contrario reading of Article 1(1). If the Char-
ter does, in fact, go further than pre-existing law (eg in 
respect of Article 13 on the freedom of the arts?), the 
UK/Poland might be able to argue that they have an 
opt-out from this new rule. 
 The second possibility concerns Article 1(2) of the 
Protocol. This says: In particular, and for the avoidance 
of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justi-
ciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom 
except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has 
provided for such rights in its national law.
 Article 1(2) therefore appears to refer back to the 
rights/principles dichotomy discussed above. The Article 
makes clear that the provisions in Title IV, the Solidarity 
Title of the Charter, contain principles and not rights, and 
principles, as Article 52(5) of the Charter makes clear, 
are not justiciable. But Article 1(2) appears to leave open 
the door to the possibility of the UK/Poland having an 
opt-out from any provisions in Title IV which might be 
considered, in the future, to contain rights, rather than 
principles. However, even if the UK/Poland do enjoy a 
limited opt-out, litigants will still be able to resort back to 
relying on the general principles of law to enforce their 
fundamental social rights.
 There is a perplexing irony about the UK and 
Polish position under Article 1(2) of the Charter. The 
UK had a labour government at the time when Protocol 
30 was adopted. The Labour party’s origins lie in the 
workers’ movement. Yet it is a labour government which 
originally identified the Solidarity Title as problematic. 
This problem is all the more acute in Poland where the 
Solidarity movement was so influential in challenging 
the Communist regime. This point was admitted by the 
Polish government in its Declaration on the Protocol:36
 Poland declares that, having regard to the tradi-
tion of social movement of ‘Solidarity’ and its significant 
contribution to the struggle for social and labour rights, it 
fully respects social and labour rights, as established by 
European Union law, and in particular those reaffirmed 
in Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.
 This Declaration appears to undermine signifi-
cantly any potential use of the Article 1(2) ‘opt-out’ in 
respect of Poland. In truth, as this Declaration shows, 
Poland’s concerns are not with social and labour rights. 
Poland’s real fears lie with subjects such as gay marriage 
and abortion but the Protocol (and the Charter) do not 
expressly touch on these.
 One final point about Article 1(2), a point which 
shows the creative potential offered by the Charter to 
interest groups. Article 1(2) says that nothing in Title IV 
of the Charter creates justiciable rights ‘except in so far 
as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such 
rights in its national law’. So if the provisions in Title IV 
do contain rights, not principles, they will be enforceable 
against the UK/Poland to the extent that the UK/Poland 
already have such rights in their system. There are many 
uncertainties about this turn of phrase, but it might be ar-
gued that if Article 28 confers a right (the right to strike), 
and because the UK has an equivalent ‘right’ (albeit that 
the right is actually drafted in the UK as an immunity37), 
then Article 28 might be justiciable even in the UK in 
the context of a dispute equivalent to the one in Viking 
arising today. Now Article 28 is not absolute: the right 
to strike is subject to Union law (namely the conditions 
laid down in Viking that the strike action must be for the 
protection of workers where the jobs or conditions of 
employment of the trade union’s members are in fact 
jeopardised or under serious threat, and that the strike 
action must be the last resort), as well as national law. 
In the UK the national law limitations are extremely 
strict: trade unions must comply with ‘detailed and le-
galistic’38 balloting and notice provisions before a strike 
can benefit from the statutory immunity in tort. Could it 
now be argued that since these national rules are giving 
effect to Article 28 of the Charter, a point emphasized 
by Article 2 of the Protocol, these national limitations 
on the right to strike must be subject to a proportionality 
review under Article 52(1) of the Charter? That would 
certainly put the cat among the pigeons.
6. Conclusions
 The Charter has already proved legally signifi-
cant. In the longer term its psychological impact may be 
almost as great. No longer is the EU merely a free trade 
area with human rights as a bolt on extra. Instead it is 
an organisation with human rights at its core. Already 
the Commission is scrutinizing all of its proposals for 
their compatibility with the Charter.39 The Fundamental 
Rights Agency is engaged in collecting, recording and 
analyzing data on human rights.40 These changes in 
focus may well spillover into the judicial sphere. The 
Viking decision was much criticized for prioritizing the 
economic right of free movement over the social right to 
strike. The free trade orientation of much of its case law, 
as exemplified by the Säger market access approach,41 
inevitably led it in that direction. However, the incor-
poration of the Charter might require a re-evaluation 
of the competing rights. No longer can it be assumed 
that the economic freedoms should take priority. Rather 
there should be a more genuine balancing between the 
competing interests. This is what Advocate General 
Trstenjak forcefully argued in Commission v. Germany 
(occupational pensions). 42 There are signs that the 
Court was somewhat swayed by her views in that case. 
 These are exciting times for the Charter. As it 
approaches its adolescence, we as lawyers shall enjoy 
the thrills and spills of the Charter’s teenage years. The 
general public might not, however, feel the same. All the 
talk of the opt-out lingers and they may well be surprised 
to discover that the Charter can be successfully invoked 
to help unpopular causes, such as failed asylum seek-
ers and foreign nationals convicted of murder, giving 
then rights and preventing them from being deported.
Catherine Barnard, Trinity College, Cambridge
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The Lisbon Treaty and the European Union’s 
external relations 
Panos Koutrakos*
Group therapy for too long, expectations too high
 Throughout the group therapy process in which 
the EU has engaged in the last nine years, from the 
fateful Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty, its 
foreign affairs have been viewed as of paramount 
importance. This was made clear in the Laeken 
Declaration, which kick-started the process in 2001, 
and raised this question: ‘[d]oes Europe not, now that 
it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new 
world order, that of a stabilising role worldwide and to 
point the way ahead for many countries and peoples?’1 
 This emphasis on the EU’s international 
role also informed the Lisbon Treaty. Launching the 
Intergovernmental Conference which led to its drafting 
and  adoption, the European Council stated that ‘[i]
n order to secure our future as an active player in a 
rapidly changing world and in the face of ever-growing 
challenges, we have to maintain and develop the 
European Union’s capacity to act…’.2 Such statements 
become even more interesting in the light of the Union’s 
ambitions: the European Security Strategy, for instance, 
states that ‘Europe should be ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security and in building a better 
world’.3
 The Union’s institutions have been tireless in 
their praise for the significance of the new provisions. 
Acording to the European Council, the Lisbon Treaty 
‘will bring increased efficiency to our external action’.4 In 
its Opinion on the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference, 
the European Commission stated that the latter ‘will 
give Europe a clear voice in relations with our partners 
worldwide, and sharpen the impact and visibility of our 
message’.5 And President Sarkozy of France wrote 
during the Russia-Georgia crisis in August 2008 that, 
had the new Treaty entered into force, the Union would 
have had the institutions it needed in order to cope 
better with international crisis.6
 This note suggests that such enthusiasm is 
exaggerated. For reasons of space, it does so by 
focusing on the main amendments introduced at Lisbon 
in the area of external political relations. 
The pillars are dead, long live the pillars  
 A major innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the significance of which has been hailed by its 
supporters incessantly, is the abolition of the pillar 
structure. A constant since the Maastricht Treaty, it 
divided the activities of the Union in three distinct 
sets of rules, the European Community, the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and, since Nice, 
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Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. 
These sets of rules also reflected different models 
of integration, the first pillar characterised by distinct 
supranational features, whereas the remaining were 
clearly intergovernmental. 
 This coexistence of different sets of rules made 
the Union legal system appear puzzling in its complexity. 
The abolition of the pillars at Lisbon led to the integration 
of CFSP, as well as Judicial and Police Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters, into a unitary framework, the EU, 
hence rendering the EC a thing of the past. 
 However, the formal abolition of the pillars has 
not necessarily given rise to a truly integrated legal order. 
Whilst the old third pillar is now fully integrated within 
the Union legal order, the CFSP framework maintains 
its very distinct legal character which differentiates it 
from all other EU external policies. This is clear from 
the  structure of the Treaties (the substantive CFSP 
provisions are still set out in TEU whilst all other EU 
policies are set out in TFEU), as well as their wording 
(Article 2(4) TFEU refers to the Union’s competence 
in the area of CFSP as a category distinct from all the 
other categories of competence). Furthermore, Article 
24(1) TEU states that the ‘common foreign and security 
policy is subject to specific rules and procedures’. If 
anything, the Lisbon Treaty underlines the distinct legal 
nature of CFSP, and renders its preservation a matter 
of constitutional significance.7 
  The existence of CFSP as a distinct pillar 
within the Union architecture is also illustrated by the 
substantive provisions of the new Treaty. In terms of 
decision-making, the prevailing role of unanimity is 
maintained,8 and any derogations are limited, clearly 
prescribed, and entirely consistent with the logic of the 
exceptions introduced by the previous constitutional 
arrangements. In terms of enforcement, CFSP is still 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 
Whilst Lisbon introduces two exceptions,9 these either 
acknowledge what has always been the case and 
merely extend the application of existing practice. 
Similarly, in terms of the legal instruments available 
to the Union in this area, whilst the Lisbon Treaty 
subsumes the previous CFSP-specific instruments into 
one, namely decisions, these carry out precisely the 
same function as their precursors. 
 This brief overview suggests that the Lisbon 
Treaty abolishes the pillar structure in name only. It 
transposes the previous set of rules into a unitary 
structure albeit with their legal characteristics intact. 
The logic of the pillar structure still permeates the 
Union constitutional order after Lisbon: whilst Member 
States are determined to broaden the scope of their 
cooperation in areas deemed to be closer to the 
functions traditionally carried out by States, and 
whilst they deem it sensible to rely upon institutions 
and processes of what used to be the Community 
legal order, they wish to do so at a different pace, in 
accordance with a different model of integration, and in 
order to achieve qualitatively different objectives. It was 
this fundamental differentiation that the establishment 
of the complex pillar structure sought to convey.  The 
abolition of the appearance of that structure by no 
means makes it any less present. Similarly, whilst the 
previous pillar-structure was viewed as complex, the 
removal of the appearance of complexity does not 
necessarily make the new legal structure any easier 
to manage. 
Re-organisation of external policies 
 The other structural change introduced at Lisbon 
is the reorganisation of all EU external policies, including 
the CFSP, under a common set of values, principles 
and objectives. These policies include the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP), development cooperation, 
economic, financial and technical cooperation with 
third countries, humanitarian aid, sanctions, CFSP, 
and CSDP. Whilst they were set out in different parts 
of primary law, each carried out in order to pursue 
its specific objectives, the Lisbon Treaty brings them 
together, and lays down a set of common principles 
and objectives which all these policies should pursue, 
irrespective of their specific legal characteristics. 
 The principles are set out in Article 21(1) TEU 
and include, rather predictably, democracy, the rule of 
law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international 
law. The objectives are set out in Article 21(2) TEU, and, 
whilst no less predictable, are noteworthy for both their 
range and ambition, and include political, economic, 
security and environmental objectives, with strong 
emphasis on effective multilateralism. 
  These principles guide not only the conduct 
of the Union’s external policies, but also the external 
aspects of the Union’s other policies.10 Whilst the 
‘depillarization’ of the Union seeks to signify the formal 
integration of its foreign affairs system, the above 
provisions aim to bring about its substantive integration. 
To that effect, the Lisbon Treaty introduces the term 
‘external action’, rather than ‘external relations’ or 
‘policies’  to cover all external economic, political and 
security strands. This term, complete with the singular in 
which it is couched, signifies the design, and therefore 
conduct, of the Union’s foreign affairs as a coherent 
whole. 
Institutional changes 
 The Lisbon Treaty has also reorganised the 
Union’s institutional machinery in the area of external 
relations by introducing a new actor, namely the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, and assigning to it a new service, 
namely European External Action Service (EEAS). 
 The aim of this innovation is to provide the 
Union’s foreign affairs with a face and to facilitate the 
coherence of external policies and provide a single point 
of contact. The High Representative is responsible for 
the conduct of the CFSP. To ensure the coherence of 
the policy she is a Vice President of the Commission 
and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. Whilst this dual 
institutional configuration appears sensible to ensure 
the coherence of the Union’s external action, in legal 
and policy terms a number of issues arise. First, the 
Treaty is strikingly vague about the role of the High 
Representative. It is silent as to which specific areas 
of EU foreign affairs are under her supervision, apart 
from CFSP, and provides no guidance as to how she 
is to interact with other EU institutions and bodies. As 
the present incumbent Baroness Ashton put it in an 
interview a few months after assuming her position, 
‘when I got the job it was me and the treaty... nobody 
handed me a blueprint and said, “Congratulations, here 
is the plan”’.11 
 Second, the double-hatting of the High 
Representative may prove to be deeply problematic. 
For instance, Article 218(3) TFEU provides that the 
High Representative, instead of the Commission, would 
recommend that the Council authorise the opening 
of negotiations of international agreements in areas 
where the subject-matter of the agreements relates 
‘exclusively or principally’ to the CFSP. In practice, 
however, the question of the delimitation between the 
CFSP and other external policies has given rise to very 
considerable inter-institutional disputes.12 
 Third, whilst the appointment of the High 
Representative was intended to bring clarity to the 
Union’s international posture and coherence in the 
conduct of its external action, in practice she is not the 
only player active in the area of foreign affairs. She 
coexists with the President of the European Council, 
the President of the Commission, and the rotating 
Presidency, each of whom is assigned a role in the 
conduct of EU external action in terms that are hardly 
clear. Therefore, the international representation of the 
Union is still not the responsibility of just one actor, and 
the determination of who speaks for the Union would 
depend, again, on the interaction between various 
actors and their ability and willingness to delineate 
theirrespevctive roles. 
 It follows from the above that the Lisbon Treaty 
merely sets out a broad and flexible framework which 
may allow the various institutional actors to act in a way 
that may enhance effectiveness and coherence. This, 
and the scope for compromise, political disagreements, 
and the inter-institutional skirmishes it entails, are 
illustrated clearly by the process of establishing the 
European External Action Service (“EEAS”).
 Considered ‘one of the most significant changes 
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon’,13 the EEAS aims 
to assist the High Representative by working in 
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member 
States. The EEAS shall consist of Commission and 
Council officials, as well as diplomats seconded from 
the Member States.14 The Lisbon Treaty, however, 
is once again silent on specifics: the distribution of 
posts amongst the Council, the Commission, and the 
Member States, the scope of the policies it oversees, 
the definition of the lines of authority between the Union 
institutions involved, and its precise function in the 
conduct of the Union’s foreign affairs are all left open. 
 Against this blank canvass, the organisation and 
management of the EEAS provided a perfect playground 
for just the kind of inter-institutional disputes which its 
establishment purported to address. They have been 
about, amongst other things, development policy and 
the involvement of the European Parliament. Following 
intense inter-institutional haggling, a compromise was 
reached, and the EEAS was set out in July 2010.15 The 
founding Decision is drafted in vague language, and the 
arrangements which it sets out are complex. Amongst 
many problems raised by the compromise is the extent 
to which diplomats of Member States would be willing 
to share intelligence with EEAS as a matter of practice.
 All in all, the institutional innovations introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of foreign affairs do not 
provide a definitive answer to the Union’s problems in 
foreign affairs and they do not fundamentally change the 
factors that have been shown to slow down the Union’s 
ability to act. Instead, they set out a new framework 
within which all the different interests and factors which 
shape the Union’s foreign affairs are rearranged. It 
is a new terrain which enables the Union’s actors to 
reconstitute their role in ways which, depending on a 
range of variables, might (or might not) enhance the 
Union’s ability to act as a credible international partner. 
Common Security and Defence Policy 
 The Lisbon Treaty pays considerable attention 
to the area of security and defence. It renames this 
Common (rather than European) Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), and groups its provisions together under 
a distinct section within Title V TEU (the latter setting 
out the general provisions of the Union’s external action 
and specific provisions on the CFSP). Finally, Article 
42(1) TEU states that the CSDP ‘shall be an integral 
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part of the common foreign and security policy’. 
 In terms of substantive content, the Lisbon 
Treaty expands the range of activities which fall within 
the scope of CSDP, albeit merely formalising existing 
practice.16 In particular, there are three areas in which 
the Lisbon Treaty introduces interesting changes. First, 
in relation to military capabilities, the Treaty imposes 
a duty on Member States to ‘make civilian and military 
capabilities available to the Union for the implementation 
of the common security and defence policy, to contribute 
to the objectives defined by the Council’.17 Furthermore, 
it provides for a special intergovernmental body, 
namely the European Defence Agency (EDA), which is 
intended to be active in the area of defence capabilities 
development, research, acquisition, and armaments.18 
 Both developments are less spectacular in their 
implications than might appear at first sight. On the one 
hand, the duty imposed on Member States is vague in 
its scope and silent as to its implications.  This duty also 
needs to be considered in the light of the numerous 
reminders in primary law that the Member States are 
the locus for the organisation of their defence.19 On 
the other hand, EDA was established in 2004, that is, 
well before the Lisbon Treaty was even drafted, and 
even before it became clear that the Constitutional 
Treaty was dead.20 Furthermore, whilst the work that 
the Agency has been doing is positive and sensible and 
well received, it is also limited in its scope, and has been 
marred by disagreements between Member States as 
to its approach and budget. 
 It becomes, thus, clear that the Lisbon provisions 
on military capabilities may play only a very limited role 
in any real progress in that area of Union operations. 
However, a number of factors are noteworthy: security 
and defence is at the very core of national sovereignty, 
the States are fully responsible for their defence as well 
as prioritising their defence spending and availability 
of resources, the financial crisis is under way and has 
given rise to cuts in defence budgets of the EU military 
powers, and the character of cooperation in this area 
as set out in primary law is distinctly intergovernmental. 
In the light of all this, it is hardly surprising that the 
role of legal provisions such as those in the Treaties is 
inherently limited.  
 The second interesting innovation introduced 
at Lisbon is flexibility. In other words, the new Treaty 
allows for formal arrangements which would enable 
groups of Member States to act together, either in a 
form of the ‘willing and able’,21 or in the context of a 
more ‘permanent structured cooperation’.22 In an entity 
as diverse in membership and defense capacity as the 
EU is, flexibility would enhance its ability to assert its 
identity on the international scene. However, two points 
are worth-making. First, there is already a considerable 
degree of flexibility in how the Union currently carries 
out its defense policy. Second, the CSDP flexibility 
provisions are couched in such broad terms that there 
are hardly any solid criteria to assess compliance - once 
again, it is for the Member States to determine what to 
make of them. 
 Finally, for the first time in the Union’s 
constitutional history, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a 
mutual assistance clause. This is laid down in Article 
42(7) TEU, and refers to cases where a Member State 
is the victim of armed aggression on its territory. In this 
case, the other Member States ‘shall have towards 
it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in 
their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter’. 
 This clause imposes on Member States a very 
broad duty accompanied by equally broad caveats. 
However, the question Article 42(7) TEU raises is how 
far are Member States required to go in order to comply 
with their duty of solidarity, and how rigorous can the 
enforcement of this duty be. Its wording is vague, and 
the inherently indeterminate criteria it sets out do not 
lend themselves to a rigorous mechanism of verification 
or control. After all, the EU is not a military alliance, and 
the mutual assistance clause does not render it one. 
Instead, this new clause appears significant in rather 
symbolic terms.23 
Conclusion
 Despite the focus of the Lisbon Treaty on 
CSDP, in the last two years only one operation has 
been launched (EUTM Somalia, contributing to the 
training of Somali security forces). This illustrates 
clearly the point made in this note: instead of providing 
the answers to questions about a more effective and 
coherent foreign policy, the new Treaty shapes a new 
negotiating environment within which the political will 
of the Member States may decide how to use the new 
toolkit. The inter-institutional skirmishes which have 
characterised the Union’s international action will not 
become a thing of the past, and the practical problems 
which have hampered the development of a truly 
effective security policy will not evaporate. As all these 
form part and parcel of the Union’s deeply idiosyncratic 
constitutional set up, they will continue to affect the 
conduct of foreign affairs in the revamped framework 
set out by the Lisbon Treaty. This assessment does 
not have to be negative: to acknowledge the limitations 
of legal arrangements in this area is to accept that 
more energy should be spent on practical, sensible 
initiatives focused on the management of the essential 
prerequisites for a common foreign, security and 
defence policy. Whether the practice of EU actors since 
Lisbon entered into force is promising in this respect is 
another matter altogether....
Panos Koutrakos, University of Bristol, 
University of Antwerp.
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The Impact of EU Norms in Latin America
Roberto Domingez, Suffolk University, Boston, MA
 The EU enlargement process provided evidence 
of the transformational effect of regional integration and 
was the object of study par excellence in the literature 
on EU external influences in domestic democratization. 
More recently, the analysis of the external relevance of 
the EU as a norm diffuser has focused on policies and 
resources created to engage new candidate members 
in the Balkans as well as non-candidates in the im-
mediate neighbourhood. However, as geographical 
distance increases between Europe and other parts of 
the globe and the EU incentives fade away, the influ-
ence of the EU decreases. From the norm diffusion 
perspective, what is the impact of EU norm diffusion 
on Latin America? 
Analytical Framework
 The study of diffusion of norms in countries 
where EU membership is not an option demands more 
analytical instruments than in cases where there are 
prospects of EU enlargement. Three theoretical tools 
are useful for the analysis of norm diffusion in Latin 
America. The first is both the strength of linkages, 
defined as “the density of ties to the European Union, 
the United States, and Western-dominated multilateral 
institutions,” and leverage, which is “governments’ vul-
nerability to external democratizing pressure” (Levitsky 
and Way 2005, 520). The linkages and leverage of the 
United States in Latin America are greater than the 
role of the EU in the region and sometimes both per-
spectives oppose one another.  Cuba epitomizes the 
competing views between the long-standing embargo 
of the United States and the cautious engagement of 
the European Union. In other cases, the density of the 
linkages of the EU is also undermined when govern-
ments diversify and intensify their relations with alter-
native powers: this is the case of China’s investment 
in Latin America and Venezuela’s growing military ties 
with Russia.
 The second element is the power of conditional-
ity. The literature on norm diffusion indicates that without 
the incentive of potential membership, EU’s influence 
over other countries’ domestic political developments 
is likely to be minimal (Schimmelfennig 2007).  In the 
case of Latin America, while there is no incentive of 
membership, the negotiation and conclusion of associa-
tion agreements with Mexico and Chile have constituted 
positive incentives to reinforce the democratic practices 
in both countries. In other cases where the rule of law 
is broken, the EU has used negative incentives such 
as suspension of aid in Honduras.
 The third element is the active participation of 
Latin America in adopting and adapting EU norms, 
namely, appropriateness (Kelly 2004).  The experience 
of norm diffusion indicates that the EU has actually 
found that over time the top down approach of the EU 
democracy promotion faces limitations (Borzel and 
Risse 2007, 5).  It is crucial to look at the orientation of 
the policies of the recipient countries, the development 
of domestic ownership of the process, and the perma-
nent dialogue (Jonasson 2009). For example, Cuba 
embraces an orientation of democracy and norms that 
contradicts the policies of the EU. Similarly, in the past 
decade Venezuela has revisited the fundamentals of 
democracy and implemented policies that produced 
acrimony in the relations with Western countries. Con-
versely, Mexico and Chile were able to negotiate asso-
ciation agreements once they had moved forward in the 
process of democratization. With regard to ownership, 
the EU has gradually offered grants through different 
programs to NGOs and local governments to promote 
human rights and democracy in Latin America. Relating 
to dialogue, in the relationship between the EU and Latin 
America, the region-to-region dialogues have been in 
place for more than a decade and more recently civil 
society has been included in the cases of Mexico, Chile 
and Brazil 
Quality of Democracy in Latin America
 The end of the Cold War renewed the expecta-
tions of improving democracy in Latin America. While 
all Latin American countries are electoral democra-
cies today, there have been setbacks, disruptions and 
unfulfilled goals producing hybrid regimes (Morlino 
and Magen 2009) or illiberal democracies (Zakaria 
2004) in numerous cases. The multidimensionality of 
democracy in Latin America has produced four groups 
of governments according to their political orientation: 
communism—at least nominally (Cuba), radical so-
cialism (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua), 
moderate left to centrism (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
Brazil, Haiti, Paraguay, Peru, Panama, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic) and conserva-
tive of right centre (Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico) 
(Emmerich 2009).  From the perspective of EU diffusion 
of norms, nominal communist countries and radical 
socialist governments are less willing to embrace EU 
norms. Venezuela and Bolivia have actually expelled 
US diplomats and human rights activists or nationalized 
European and US companies in the past years. On the 
contrary, countries such as Mexico or Chile have signed 
most of the human rights international conventions and 
also negotiated association agreements with the EU 
where democracy clauses are included. 
Mexico and Venezuela: Contrasting Cases
 Mexico is a case study in which the conjunc-
tion of domestic transformations and the adaptation 
and adoption of EU norms brought about stimulating 
results. In 2008, Freedom House ranked Mexico as a 
Free State while the global governance scores of the 
World Bank indicated that in the area of rule of law 
and corruption Mexico has slightly decreased its per-
formance and increased or maintained stability in the 
areas of government effectiveness between 1996 and 
2008 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009). 
 The negotiation of the Agreement on Economic 
Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation, 
which came into force in 2000 and was the first between 
the EU and a Latin American country, was an incentive 
for democratization.  The negotiation was protracted 
initially due to Mexico’s reluctance to include the de-
mocracy clause; however, the Mexican government 
quickly realized it had no other choice but to accept the 
democracy clause, which was a sine qua non condition 
to conclude the negotiation. A second element that the 
EU propelled in the democratization of Mexico was the 
pressure on the Mexican government to accept Euro-
pean funding for NGOs to monitor elections.
 Since the Association Agreement came into 
force, the European support to modernization and 
adaptation of norms has increased. As for concrete 
areas of cooperation, for the period 2007-2013, the 
EU earmarked €55 million for Mexico, focusing on 
three sectors: a) Social cohesion and support to re-
lated policy dialogues; b) Sustainable Economy and 
c) Competitiveness (European Commission 2007a). 
Cooperation in the human rights sector has also sub-
stantially increased because the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has sponsored 
19 projects in Mexico for a total of approximately €3.2 
million since 2002.  The Commission has also negoti-
ated two targeted projects with the UN Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) with 
a total EU contribution of €1.4 million. 
 The Association Agreement has also developed 
mechanisms of dialogue to include NGOs and civil 
society, igniting a sense of ownership of the projects. 
In the case of civil society, there is a bi-annual meeting 
of Mexican and European civil society organizations, 
which is emulated in the case of Chile and the EU. 
Despite the relatively small size and value compared 
to bilateral cooperation, NGO co-financed projects in 
Mexico (7 projects / €4.5 million) have an important 
impact as their thematic and grass-roots focus is highly 
relevant to the social, cultural and economic situation 
of the country.
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 The deterioration of the quality of democracy 
has been a trend in the past decade in Venezuela. In 
2008, Freedom House downgraded it to non-electoral 
democracy (Freedom House 2009) and in the index of 
political freedom changed it from Free to Partially Free 
in 1999,while the World Bank indicates that in the area 
of rule of law, corruption and government effective-
ness, Venezuela’s rank has been steadily dropping 
(Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009).
 The role of the European Union has been quite 
limited in the promotion of democracy in Venezuela. 
Economically, the United States is the main trade 
partner of Venezuela (35%), followed by the European 
Union, which represents only 8.9% of Venezuela’s total 
trade. Alternatively, Venezuela has been forging deeper 
relations with Iran, China, and Russia, particularly in 
the area of oil resources, which represents 80% of its 
exports. 
 The course of the reforms in Venezuela is to 
some extent opposed to the type of policies the United 
State and the European Union embrace.  Venezuela 
opposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas and has 
proposed the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America 
and the Caribbean. As a testimony to these contrast-
ing views, the President of the European Commission, 
José Manuel Barroso, stated that “whether this political 
attitude prospers (in reference to Venezuela), European 
businesses will not be harmed as a consequence be-
cause there are abundant investment opportunities in 
other regions, and the victims will be poor people in 
Latin America” (Barroso 2006).
 Despite the limited leverage of the EU, the 
Union has reacted in several occasions in light of the 
deterioration of democracy in Venezuela.  The use of 
declarations to condemn or support significant events in 
Venezuelan politics has been used often times (curtail of 
freedom of speech in 2007 or supporting the December 
2007 referendum). 
 Concerning EU assistance to Venezuela, the 
main focus of the Country Strategy Papers has been 
economic modernization.  In the 2001-2006 CSP, pre-
vention and reconstruction (due to the floods in 1999) 
and trade diversification (fisheries) were the two priority 
areas, while in the 2007-2013 CSP the EU supported 
the decentralization of the Venezuelan state and the 
diversification of the economy.  With regard to human 
rights and democracy, the EIDHR has sponsored 7 
projects with local NGOs as of the end of 2009 and the 
EU Commission approved a project to assist the OAS 
in implementing the agreement reached between the 
OAS, the Venezuelan government and the opposition 
after social unrest in 2002 (European Commission 
2007b).
Final Considerations
 In contrast to the prospects of membership 
in Central and Eastern European countries, in which 
there were strong incentives for internalizing EU norms, 
the transformative power of the EU is limited in Latin 
America.  Nonetheless, this has not precluded the EU 
from investing political and economic resources to help 
improving the quality of democracy in Latin America.  All 
limits considered, the successful implementation of EU 
policies in Latin America should include a) the setting for 
norm diffusion, b) positive and negative conditionality, 
and c) elements conducive for the appropriateness of 
the recipient (orientation, ownership and dialogue).
Roberto Domingez, Suffolk University
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European Publics and the Lisbon Agenda
Maurits van der Veen
 At the European Council meeting in March 2000 in 
Lisbon, the national political leaders of the European 
Union (EU) member states set themselves ‘a new stra-
tegic goal for the next decade’: ‘to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ 
(European Council, 2000). Ten years later, the Lisbon 
agenda is widely seen as a failure; nevertheless, Eu-
ropean leaders have decided to continue to pursue the 
same goals for another decade, now under the ambit of 
the Europe 2020 program. In what sense has the Lisbon 
agenda failed, and why does the European Union con-
tinue to pursue the same basic agenda? In this note, I 
suggest that analyzing public opinion about the Lisbon 
strategy can shed light on both of these questions.
 It is striking how little effort was made to explain 
the Lisbon agenda to European citizens; all the more 
so in light of the prominence of debates about the 
EU’s democratic deficit during the past decade. The 
Economist’s Charlemagne, in assessing 10 years of 
the Lisbon strategy, implies that perhaps the omission 
was deliberate on the part of European leaders: most 
European voters may not have wanted the Lisbon 
agenda to be any more successful than it was, since 
they “prefer security to dynamism”. Charlemagne’s 
analysis is familiar but superficial, noting that lots of 
Europeans “like long holidays, restrictive labour laws, 
generous welfare states and 35 hour weeks” (“Do 
Europeans want a dynamic economy?,” 2010). That is 
certainly true, but such preferences need not prevent 
dynamism; nor, more generally, is it the case that dy-
namism is incompatible with security, as Charlemagne 
implies. 
 In fact, it would be exceedingly strange if Europeans 
did not like the benefits offered by a generous welfare 
state. This does not mean, however, that they might not 
willing to exchange some of those benefits for improved 
economic performance, if a case were made that such 
an exchange was necessary and feasible. The problem 
is that the Lisbon agenda did not convincingly made this 
case; moreover, to the extent that it made the case at 
all, this was rarely conveyed to the public. As we shall 
see, the latter appears to be bemused, at best, by its 
leaders’ insistence on the urgency of the Lisbon (and 
now Europe 2020) agenda.
EU Public Opinion and Participation
Interest Section
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European publics have rarely been polled on the Lis-
bon strategy per se. In fact, Eurobarometer surveys 
appear to have investigated awareness of the strategy 
just twice: in May/June 2006 (EB 65.3) and May/June 
2009 (EB71.2).1 Given the dearth of public information 
on the Lisbon strategy, the low levels of awareness ob-
served do not come as a surprise. In 2006, just 15.7% 
of respondents in the EU member states reported that 
they had heard of “the EU’s ‘Lisbon Strategy’ for Growth 
and Jobs” (question QC1). In 2009, that figure had risen 
to 24.38% (QD1), but much of the rise is likely due 
to confusion with the Lisbon Treaty, which was going 
through the ratification process in 2008-2009. Respon-
dents were also asked about the Erasmus program 
(intra-EU student exchanges). This program is older 
than the Lisbon agenda, so it has had more time to 
become known, but it is also much narrower in scope. 
Nevertheless, in 2006, 24.93% said they had heard of 
this program, while in 2009 the figure was 28.39%. In 
other words, more people were aware of a program 
open only to university students than of an initiative 
intended to revitalize the entire economy.
 Of course, low awareness does not mean lack of 
support for the Lisbon strategy’s goals. The most ex-
tensive Eurobarometer polling on the Lisbon agenda 
took place in the Fall of 2004 (EB62.1), as the EU was 
conducting a midterm review of the strategy. However, 
respondents were not asked whether they had any idea 
what the strategy entailed; instead, after saying “Now, 
let’s talk about the Lisbon Agenda,” the survey simply 
proceeded to ask a set of broad questions about the 
economic situation in Europe. Terminating the set is a 
question (QB13) that appears intended to gauge public 
confidence in achieving the Lisbon agenda’s goal of 
becoming the world’s most competitive and dynamic 
economy: “In your opinion, could the European Union 
become the world’s top economic power within the next 
five years?” 
 Just under 40% of respondents (39.72%) thought 
the EU could ‘certainly’ or ‘probably’ do so, with those 
in Southern or Eastern states comparatively more 
likely to answer in the affirmative. When the question 
was asked again the following Spring (EB 63.4), the 
EU-wide figure had fallen to 38.6%, with even lower 
rates in core EU countries such as France (27.67%) 
and Germany (21.91%). Such low scores might lead 
one to conclude that the European public did not sup-
port the Lisbon goals. However, the question is poorly 
phrased. First, it is not obvious that the most competi-
tive and dynamic economy would automatically also be 
the world’s top economic power. More generally, it is 
unclear what would make a country the top economic 
power; the question clearly assumes the EU was not, 
but measured by total GDP — an obvious choice — it 
already was. Finally, if the EU indeed was not (yet) the 
top power, just how far was it from reaching this posi-
tion? Given such lack of clarity, answers to this question 
are of little help in assessing public confidence in the 
Lisbon agenda.
 If observers like the Economist’s Charlemagne 
are correct about European voters wanting the Lisbon 
agenda to fail, we should be able to find evidence that 
Europeans were opposed to increased competition. A 
promising indicator here is question QB6 in EB62.1. 
Noting that “the single market increased competition 
in a number of domains such as transport, telecom-
munication services, banking services and insurances,” 
the question asked: “In general, would you say that 
this has a … effect?” Perhaps surprisingly, 62.86% of 
respondents felt that increased market competition had 
a very positive or rather positive effect. Even among 
the French — popular targets for those who lampoon 
European anti-globalization fears — 59.24% felt that 
the increased competition had been positive.
 European economy was performing better than 
the American economy, and more than half (51.43%) 
thought it was performing as well or better. Once again, 
question phrasing leaves something to be desired, since 
respondents undoubtedly interpreted the “performance” 
of the economy to mean a variety of different things. 
Nevertheless, it is striking that more than half of all 
respondents apparently did not share the worries that 
inspired their leaders to consider the Lisbon strategy a 
failure until that point (e.g. “Prodi attacks failed growth 
plans,” 2004). 
 Even more interestingly, this same question has 
been asked several times in the ensuing years. We have 
data not just for the Fall of 2004, but also for the Spring 
of 2005 (EB 63.4), the Spring of 2008 (EB 69.2), and 
the Summer of 2009 (EB 71.3). Figure 1 shows the per-
centage of respondents that felt the European economy 
was doing as well as the American economy or better 
at each of these four time points. Countries are sorted 
from most to least positive about Europe in the Fall of 
2004. One immediate conclusion from the figure is that, 
by the public’s estimates, the relative performance of 
the European economy improved considerably in the 
second half of the decade. In recent years about 60% 
of respondents felt that European performance at least 
matched that of the United States (60.35% in 2008 and 
59.7% in 2009). 
 As always, overall averages hide considerable 
cross-national variation. Nevertheless, in the Sum-
mer of 2009, 4 in 10 respondents in Spain — the least 
optimistic country —still felt Europe matched or out-
performed the United States, and in Ireland, ravaged 
by the economic crisis, a majority (54.18%) actually 
felt this way. The three Nordic member states and the 
Netherlands were particularly positive about Europe’s 
economic performance, each scoring over 80% on this 
count. Indeed, roughly two thirds of the respondents in 
these four countries felt that the European economy 
outperformed the United States. (In the Spring of 2008, 
before the worst of the economic crisis hit, the latter 
figure was as high as 83.86%, in the Netherlands.)
 The data thus suggest a different conclusion from 
that put forward by Charlemagne and other observers. 
It is not the case that Europeans did not want the Lis-
bon strategy to succeed; instead, Europeans were less 
convinced of the urgency of the Lisbon strategy than 
were their political leaders at the time of the strategy’s 
midterm review in 2004-2005. Moreover, towards the 
end of the strategy’s decade, most felt that the Euro-
pean economy’s performance relative to that of the 
United States had improved further. Finally, they were 
largely positive in 2004 about increased competition — 
the opposite of what one would expect if they wanted 
Lisbon to fail because it might threaten their security.
 One might argue that Europeans simply deceive 
themselves or are uninformed. Interestingly, the EU’s 
own interpretation of these survey results was that re-
spondents “have a fairly accurate view of the economic 
reality in the EU… [but] their knowledge of the European 
Union’s economic performance in relation to its main 
global competitors tends to be weak” (2005, p. 60). 
This assessment represents a clear, albeit probably 
unintended, indictment of the way European leaders 
tackled the Lisbon agenda — an indictment that also 
comes through implicitly in the survey data reviewed 
here. As I suggested at the beginning of this note, it was 
never entirely clear what the Lisbon agenda entailed, 
even for its main supporters. That lack of clarity led to 
muddled public messaging at best, which in turn pro-
duced a public that was largely bemused by the urgent 
language used in official Lisbon declarations.
 Even after a decade of discussion on the Lisbon 
agenda, it is hard to pin down its goals. There is little 
doubt that its key supporters were convinced, first, that 
knowledge-based economic activities were crucial to 
sustained economic growth, and, second, that Europe 
was lagging behind the United States in this area. Nei-
ther of these perceptions were new; in fact, they had 
been put forward repeatedly since the early 1990s (cf. 
Krugman, 1994, p. 29). The key problem was that the 
first hypothesis was generally taken on faith (and, in 
any case, essentially untestable), while the empirical 
accuracy of the second depended on one’s choice of 
metric. This made it difficult to make a strong case for 
either, let alone propose specific target policies. 
 In fact, the strategies proposed in the original dec-
laration were strikingly vague: ‘better policies for the 
information society and R&D’, ‘structural reform for 
competitiveness and innovation’, ‘completing the inter-
nal market’, ‘modernising the European social model’ 
‘investing in people’, ‘combating social exclusion’, and 
‘applying an appropriate macro-economic policy mix’. 
Some benchmarks were suggested as well: ‘regain[ing] 
the conditions for full employment’, ‘strengthen[ing] 
regional cohesion in the European Union’, and achiev-
ing ‘an average economic growth rate of around 3%’. 
Implementation was to take place ‘by improving the 
existing processes’ and by assigning a ‘stronger guid-
ing and coordinating role for the European Council’.2 
All of these relied on inoffensive, generally accepted 
buzzwords, with, at best, an uncertain connection to 
economic logic or actual policy choices. 
 More importantly, the original Lisbon declaration 
failed to make the case either that the resulting out-
comes were crucial to Europe’s future, or that certain 
welfare state benefits needed to be relinquished in order 
to achieve such key outcomes. As a result, European 
leaders were faced with a difficult challenge. They were 
convinced serious structural reforms were necessary, 
but could offer no unambiguous metrics to substanti-
ate that conviction. At the same time, most structural 
reforms would need to be implemented at the national, 
not the European level — it wasn’t the European level 
that was broken, so to speak (an impression that also 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of respondents that feels the European 
economy performs better than or as well as the American economy.
 The most illuminating question in Eurobarometer 
62.1 is one that goes to the heart of the motivation for 
the Lisbon agenda. QB5 asks: “In general, would you 
say that the European economy is performing better, 
performing worse or performing as well as the <Ameri-
can, Japanese, Chinese, Indian> economy?” Since the 
Lisbon agenda was quite explicitly inspired by concerns 
that EU economic performance lagged behind that of 
the United States (e.g. Kok, 2004, p. 8), respondents’ 
assessments of performance relative to that country 
are of obvious interest. In the Fall of 2004, more than 
a quarter (26.84%) of EU respondents felt that the
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ufl.edu). Please use the phrase “EUSA Review Guest 
Editor Proposal” as the subject line. Representatives 
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comes through in the Eurobarometer data). Moreover, 
the countries with the most extensive welfare states 
were among the most dynamic and competitive within 
the EU, undermining the rhetoric about the need to 
“modernize” the welfare state. Finally, any real reforms 
would create groups of losers as well as winners, some-
thing governments preferred to avoid. It is not all that 
surprising that political leaders punted, attempting to 
sell Lisbon by falling back on the rhetoric of competi-
tiveness. As Krugman has noted, “many of the world’s 
leaders have found the competitive metaphor extremely 
useful as a political device” (1994, p. 40).
 We have seen the implications for European public 
opinion: Europeans, on balance, feel the European 
economy is doing as well as or better than the Ameri-
can economy, and they do not see the need for seri-
ous structural reforms. This, in turn, has had a clear 
impact on the achievements — or lack thereof — of 
the Lisbon agenda. The 2010 ‘Lisbon Strategy evalu-
ation document’ acknowledged that ‘the overall pace 
of implementing reforms was both slow and uneven’ 
and that ‘EU-level targets were too numerous and did 
not sufficiently reflect differences in starting positions 
between the Member States’ (European Commission, 
2010, pp. 4-6). More significantly for our purposes, the 
evaluation document proposed as a key metric of suc-
cess “whether the Strategy shaped reform agendas 
by forging greater consensus amongst stakeholders 
on challenges and policy responses” (2010, p. 1). On 
this count, it should be clear, we have to consider the 
strategy a failure, at least with respect to European 
publics as stakeholders.
 As far as most Europeans are concerned, there is 
little evidence that the United States economy is better 
positioned to produce sustainable economic growth 
than the European economy. Indeed, those EU member 
states whose social model appears to differ most from 
that in the United States — the Nordic countries — ap-
pear to perform best at generating sustainable growth. 
Moreover, they have also taken the lead in information 
technology and related industries. To the extent that 
this overall perception is widely shared, any attempt 
to motivate structural reform by pointing to the alleged 
lead of the United States in these same areas is bound 
to fail. If European leaders are certain the perception 
is false, they have to offer clear metrics to support that 
conclusion. If they are convinced structural reforms are 
needed for other reasons, it will be more useful to offer 
specific arguments for specific reforms. 
 Writing in these pages a decade ago, Martin Rhodes 
hopefully framed the Lisbon agenda as the product of 
“a quest for a new synthesis in EU social policy.” As 
the Eurobarometer questions about Lisbon indicated, 
however, most European leaders have sold it primarily 
as “the EU’s ‘Lisbon Strategy’ for Growth and Jobs.” 
Rhodes already noted that a focus on welfare state 
reform “requires confrontation with often well-organized 
vested interests”, and pointed out that “enormous politi-
cal will is required” to even begin this task (2000). The 
past ten years made clear what happens when that 
political will is lacking, with political leaders sidestepping 
confrontation and pointing to a non-verifiable — and to 
most Europeans, unconvincing — leadership position 
of the American economy in terms of competitiveness, 
dynamism, and information technology. For Lisbon’s 
successor, Europe 2020, to have more of an impact, on 
public opinion as well as on outcomes, some confronta-
tion will be necessary. It remains to be seen whether 
emphasizing the “three mutually reinforcing priorities” of 
smart growth, sustainable growth, and inclusive growth 
will convince European publics that real reforms are 
needed.3 
Maurits van der Veen, College of William & Mary 
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Endnotes
1  This article references six different Eurobarometer 
surveys. Their official citations are: EB 62.1 (Papacostas 
& European Commission, 2010a), EB 63.4 (Papacostas 
& European Commission, 2006), EB 65.3 (Papacostas & 
European Commission, 2010b), EB 69.2 (Papacostas & 
European Commission, 2009), EB 71.2 (Papacostas & 
European Commission, 2010c), and EB 71.3 (Papacostas 
& European Commission, 2010d).
2  The overall goal was listed in paragraph 5 of the 
Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon summit, as were the 
key strategies. The benchmarks, such as they are, were 
listed in paragraph 6, and the implementation suggestions 
in paragraph 7 (European Council, 2000).
3   Front page of the Europe 2020 website, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm (accessed 6 
February 2011).
EUSA Review    Winter 2011  25 24     Winter 2011  EUSA Review
Enlargement and EU development policy
Simon Lightfoot
 
 Each enlargement of the European Union (EU) 
has altered the geographical focus of development 
policy. The 1973 enlargement brought the former Brit-
ish colonies into the fold, whilst the 1986 enlargement 
to Spain and Portugal shifted focus to Latin America. 
It was therefore clear that the enlargement of the EU 
in 2004 to Central and Eastern Europe could alter the 
nature of the EU’s development policy, especially its 
geographic focus. The 2004 enlargement of the EU 
was also significant because never before had so many 
recipients of EU aid joined the Union and taken on the 
commitment to become aid donors. This piece therefore 
explores both phenomena: to what extent has enlarge-
ment altered EU development policy and the extent to 
which the EU-12 group of new donors have taken on 
board the acquis. 
 Orbie and Versluys (2008) show that the EU-12 
have two clear priorities for EU development policy. The 
first is the strengthening of the “eastern dimension” of 
EU external relations as a part of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy and the second appears to be related 
to the objectives of development cooperation, which 
many of the EU-12 see as an instrument to achieve 
broader foreign and security policy aims, rather than to 
reduce poverty as an end in itself (Orbie and Versluys 
2008, p. 87). We have seen the EU-12, especially those 
states from Central and Eastern Europe, who have 
limited historical connections to developing countries in 
Africa and tend to direct their bilateral aid to neighbour-
ing states within Europe, adding to the voices within 
the EU questioning the EU’s relations with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Since enlargement 
we have seen subtle changes in attitudes towards the 
ACP group within the EU. Looking at the Human De-
velopment Index we can see part of the problem, with 
two ACP states coming higher up the league table than 
four EU states, all of whom are new members. There 
is therefore a sense within many new states that they 
should not be paying to support the former colonies 
of France and the UK and this has given a spur to the 
‘normalization’ of relations with ACP states which has 
been slowly happening over the last two decades (see 
Holland, 2004). 
 At the same time we have seen an increasing 
focus on the Eastern dimension. The majority of aid 
from the EU-12 states goes to Moldova, Ukraine and 
Georgia, along with the former Yugoslavia and they 
wish to see a strengthening of EU action in this area. 
The Slovenian Presidency of early 2008 gave us the 
first real evidence of this shift in focus, with their very 
clear sense of priority in the field of development be-
ing the Western Balkans. The creation of the Eastern 
Partnership in 2008 by Poland and Sweden was a 
significant development, and seen as a priority by the 
Czech presidency of early 2009. In addition, although 
the Czech presidency argued that it would implement 
EU-Africa Strategy however, at the same time, it plans 
to emphasize ‘geographical balance within the relations 
between the EU and other regions’. Their Presidency 
had set out to promote the “three E” priorities: economy, 
energy and the EU in the world, including global devel-
opment. However, according to Horky (2010), through-
out the course of the presidency, the third “E” came to 
stand for eastern Europe, at the cost of a focus on the 
development of the South. 
 We have also seen some examples of where 
EU-12 states have flexed their muscles in relation to 
the EU’s relations with the developing world and added 
weight to different coalitions of states. In 2008 there was 
a large CAP underspend which prompted a debate as 
to how it should be spent: should it be used to assist 
farmers in the developing world to increase productivity 
in the face of the world food crisis or top-up farm subsi-
dies? EU-12 states tended to align themselves with the 
European subsidy camp. We also saw concern raised 
by many of the EU-12 in the run up to the Copenhagen 
about EU plans to spend money on climate change 
mitigation in developing countries. The problem was 
that some of these states, notably Poland, objected to 
the sums of money being suggested, especially during 
the recession. In particular, they objected to the idea 
that contributions should be based upon historic emis-
sions. Poland feared that a past-emissions formula will 
leave it with an ‘unfair’ and ‘excessive’ amount to pay. 
Polish finance minister Jacek Rostowski said wealthier 
member states ‘cannot expect the poorer countries 
of the EU to be the ones who are disproportionately 
helping the poorest countries in the Third World’. An 
excellent example where some EU-12 states tried to 
alter the political focus of an EU policy was the whole 
question of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights. 
There were plans to include references to these rights 
in the EU-Africa Strategy, which prompted a number of 
member states, including Ireland, Malta and Poland, to 
object. 
 Yet having said all this it is clear that all the re-
cent changes to EU development policy highlighted by 
Carbone (2010) have all occurred since enlargement. 
The radical changes forecast by some NGOs have 
not happened, which is linked to the salience of the 
development issue in most EU-12 states. Despite the 
new development commissioner coming from Latvia 
and the new humanitarian aid commissioner coming 
from Bulgaria, development policy is not a high profile 
issue. It is felt that governments in the EU-12 lack 
commitment to development issues, which is unsur-
prising given the lack of a significant constituency for 
development cooperation. This can be seen in relation 
to their acquis target to provide 0.33% GNI as Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) by 2015. Nearly all the 
EU-12 states, and to be fair many old states, are a long 
way off reaching this target. Part of the problem is that 
the acquis here is seen to be ‘soft law’ or political rather 
than legal commitments and the political will is lacking, 
especially during recession. 
 This situation is not helped by weak legal and 
political frameworks, such as the lack of detailed laws 
or multi-annual budgets. International development 
policy is therefore in a precarious position within many 
states. This could be seen in the aftermath of the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008/9 with nearly all states cutting 
their development budgets. Bulgaria cut its budget by 
27%, whilst Hungary cut theirs by 9%. Having said all 
this it must be borne in mind that Greece and Italy saw 
huge cuts in their international development budgets. In 
sum this produces a situation, where in the Slovakian 
parliamentary discussion following the first reading of 
the Development Act, the former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Eduard Kukan could state that: ‘Nobody will 
get mad if we will not fulfil the targets and we have to 
defend it internationally that we cannot be compared 
with Scandinavian and other countries active in this area 
for years and that we can reach required percentages 
gradually’ (Drążkiewicz, 2008). This point is crucial and 
relates to both the domestic points outlined above plus 
the relative weakness of the acquis in the field. 
 So what are the overall implications of enlarge-
ment for EU Development Policy? To a large extent, the 
EU-12 states do not at present have the political and 
public will, nor the government structures in place to try 
and significantly alter its current direction. Development 
is still not a high political priority, due, in part, to a low 
level of public familiarity with development aid issues. 
The low level of public awareness, combined with high 
levels of poverty within many EU-12 states, accounts 
for the lack of political will. Most aid money is spent in 
neighbouring states where the rationale for aid is clear 
and there is also a perceived benefit to the donor state, 
be it in security or trade terms. However, we are seeing 
small signs that the EU-12 states are willing to push their 
own agendas on development policy, especially in rela-
tion to aid spending. The addition of the EU-12 states 
gives increased weight to the pro-Eastern neighbours’ 
coalition and weakens the pro-ACP group. 2011 and 
2012 will give us a much clearer idea on the direction 
of travel for EU development policy proposed by the 
EU-12 states given the current Hungarian and forthcom-
ing Polish and Cypriot Presidencies. Simon Maxwell 
and Mikaela Gavas recently posted a blog about the 
EU-12. They concluded that the Green Paper on EU 
development policy in support of inclusive growth and 
sustainable development and the Financial Perspec-
tives debate will dominate the discussions and will be 
shaped in part by the interests of the EU-12 states. 
Perhaps ten years on from becoming donors we will 
see the interests of these states better reflected in EU 
development policy with all the implications this may 
have for the historic development relationship with the 
ACP. 
Simon Lightfoot, Leeds University
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Book Reviews
 Especially interesting is the analysis of the 
cross-application of free movement and competition 
rules. On the one hand, the authors identify cases 
where free movement rules have been applied to private 
parties either through the official recognition of hori-
zontal direct effect (e.g. C-415/93 Bosman, C-281/98 
Angonese) or through the extended understanding of 
vertical situations so as to cover cases where states 
have allowed obstacles to free movement raised by 
individuals (e.g. C-265/95 C. v. France – Spanish 
Strawberries, C-112/00 Schimidberger). On the other 
hand, the authors put forward cases where competition 
rules have been applied to the state (e.g. 13/77 INNO 
v. ATAB). Against the background of these cases, the 
authors discuss where the line is between the “state” 
and an “undertaking” and how one knows which rules 
to apply. The authors see the development of the case 
law as a combination of the Court’s functional approach 
to free movement and the teleological interpretation of 
the effet utile on which competition rules are based (p. 
128).
 The contribution of this book to the abundant 
academic literature on the internal market lies in that 
it focuses on the interaction of two main sets of provi-
sions – on free movement and on competition – which, 
being a “moving target”, as the authors say (p. 211), has 
remained underexplored to the present day. Particularly 
useful is the analysis of this public private interface in 
four specific areas: commercial state monopolies; public 
undertakings and special and exclusive rights; services 
of general economic interest; and state aids. What 
in my view is not sufficiently covered in the analysis, 
although the authors have consciously left this out, is 
the third element of the internal market jigsaw – the 
Court’s approach to positive integration, particularly to 
the competence of EU institutions to regulate the mar-
ket in order to remove obstacles to free movement or 
appreciable distortions of competition. Still, the book’s 
clear and detailed reasoning with its logical structure 
make it a good read.
Tamara Perisin, University of Zagreb
Andrew Jordan, Dave Huitema, Harro van Asselt, 
Tim Rayner, and Frans Berkhout (eds). Climate 
Change Policy in the European Union: Confronting the 
dilemmas of Mitigation and Adaptation?  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
 This useful volume has three stated aims: to 
describe policies related to climate change in the Eu-
ropean Union, as they are and as they have developed 
over time; to examine the underlying dimensions of 
Wolf Sauter and Harm Schepel. State and Market in 
European Union Law: The Public and Private Spheres 
of the Internal Market before the EU Courts. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 In the European Union, there is a lively debate 
on the interaction between free movement rules and 
competition rules. One could argue that these rules 
have the same aim which is the optimal functioning 
of the internal market (e.g. C-412/93 Leclerc), so that 
interpretations of their scope and permissible justifica-
tions should converge. But arguments can equally be 
made against this reasoning, as the Treaty itself is 
drafted in such a way as to entail two different sets of 
provisions – (arguably) those relating to the state and 
those relating to undertakings (e.g. 177&178/82 Van 
de Haar). 
 Sauter and Schepel’s book deals with these 
very current issues by looking at the concepts of the 
“market” and the “State”, concepts of private and public 
spheres, and it discusses not only where the line be-
tween the concepts is and what the areas where they 
interact are, but also how these issues are dealt with by 
the European Courts. The authors place their analysis 
in the context of European economic constitutionalism, 
German Ordoliberalism and the French doctrine of 
service public (p. 2), although they eventually concede 
that these concepts are not particularly helpful for un-
derstanding what the Court is doing in the field of the 
internal market (p. 219).
 The main part of the book convincingly presents 
the Court’s case law on free movement and competition 
rules. The changes in case law which have occurred 
over the decades are explained as reflections of the 
principles of functionalism, subsidiarity and pre-emption 
intended to preserve a balance in the division of power 
between the EU, its Member States and the market. For 
example, an argument is put forward that these prin-
ciples can be seen in the fact that the broadening of the 
scope of what is now Art. 34 TFEU in 8/74 Dassonville 
and 120/78 Cassis was accompanied by the extension 
of permissible justification (rule of reason and manda-
tory requirements); or in the fact that the later narrowing 
of the scope of Art. 34 TFEU in C-267-8/91 Keck was 
accompanied by the article’s “horizontal advance”, e.g. 
in C-292/92 Hunermund, where self-regulatory associa-
tions are treated equally as public authorities (e.g. pp. 
45, 73). 
choice that gave rise to these policies; and to explore 
alternative scenarios for further development of policies 
over the next 10 to 30 years.
 It is on the first of these aims that the volume 
provides its most significant contribution, a through 
description of current policies, their historical devel-
opment, and their institutional setting.  Early chapters 
provide concise introductions to EU institutions, major 
landmarks of their development, and the major con-
tending theoretical accounts of them – sufficient to 
bring readers up to speed on the EU context.  There 
then follow separate histories of several strands of 
climate-related policy – policies for burden-sharing 
among member states, renewable energy, the green-
house-gas emissions-trading system, and adaptation 
to climate change.  The accounts are admirably cogent, 
providing a great deal of political, institutional, and 
historical detail that has not previously been offered 
in any single, widely available source.  They cover the 
period from the first emergence of climate change as 
a policy issue in the 1970s, through preparation of the 
EU negotiating position for the Copenhagen climate 
meetings in December, 2009.
 The volume’s second aim, examining underly-
ing choices, relies on a simple conceptual scheme that 
identifies six dimensions of policy choice – what prob-
lem to address; at what level to act; when to act; what 
specific action (policy) to adopt; how to distribute costs 
and benefits; and how to implement and enforce policy 
choices – plus five “paradoxes” of EU policy-making 
that complicate choices on these six dimensions.  The 
six dimensions of policy choice are used to organize the 
interpretive sections of the chapters on specific policy 
areas.  This approach gives the collection an unusual 
degree of organizational consistency and conceptual 
coherence for a multi-author edited volume, but it is 
unclear how much benefit beyond this the scheme pro-
vides.  The taxonomy does not offer much conceptual 
traction, and its intended uses in the scheme of the 
whole book are not entirely clear.  The six dimensions of 
choice are in some chapters identified as “governance 
dilemmas,” but it is not clear what it means for them to 
be dilemmas, beyond the obvious observation that any 
significant policy choice is difficult.  Similarly unclear is 
the relationship of these choice dimensions to the five 
“paradoxes” of EU governance –a set of loosely stated 
contradictions between the declared aspirations of EU 
climate policy and its realization – which appear in the 
volume’s introduction and conclusion, but of which little 
use is made in the analysis of specific policies. 
 The third aim, exploring future policies, is devel-
oped in two chapters.  One provides a methodological 
background on scenario methods and policy exercises, 
while the other reports on a preliminary use of these 
methods to structure discussions with two groups of 
EU policy participants and experts. The discussion is 
stimulating and the exercises appear to have provoked 
a useful discussion.  One of the most interesting as-
pects of the project, however, was its aspiration to draw 
mutually enriching connections between the analysis of 
past policies and the exploratory examination of future 
ones, and this is only a little realized. One hopes the 
authors will take this aspect of the work further.
 Two further brief critical notes:  First, the discus-
sions of policy challenges do not always distinguish 
clearly enough between issues related to the specific 
EU institutional setting, and general characteristics of 
climate-change policy that manifest in multiple domains. 
A prominent example is the discussion of the diffuse 
treatment of adaptation and its problematic separation 
from mitigation: this is characteristic of climate policy 
virtually everywhere, not just in the EU.  Second, the 
chapter on water policy – while a fine history of EU 
policy on this issue – fits rather awkwardly in the vol-
ume, since one of its major points is that considerations 
of climate change have played virtually no role in this 
policy thus far, although they clearly ought to.  These 
and other nits aside, this is a useful volume.  It will be 
a particularly valuable read for scholars and practitio-
ners of climate-change policy who need a one-stop 
presentation of the institutional, political, and historical 
complexities of these policies in the EU. 
Edward A. Parson, University of Michigan
Christian Twigg-Flesner (ed.). The Cambridge Com-
panion to European Union Private Law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
 Well into its teens by now, the private law of 
the European Union has its own companion. The very 
appearance of a publication of this sort is indeed a 
coming-of-age moment for a discipline whose exis-
tence was hard to fathom until the 1980s. Member 
states’ judges and lawyers have come full circle, from 
resisting European Union private law as an intrusion 
into a quintessentially national sphere, to embracing it 
as a natural consequence of market integration. The 
question is no longer whether or not to approximate the 
private laws of the member states. The question is how 
to do it. This remarkable shift in attitude is the result 
of relentless efforts spearheaded by the Commission 
in the name of a seamless market. The fact that legal 
scholars throughout the Union have collaborated, in 
different ways but with reliable enthusiasm, to the study 
of private law harmonization is a function both of ear-
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marked EU funding and of the socio-cultural pay-offs 
of the enterprise: the rejuvenation of the disciplines of 
comparative law and legal history, the opportunity to 
rationalize and modernize obsolete branches of eco-
nomic law and, for some at least, the chance to engage 
in a long overdue discussion on the distributive effects 
of private law rules and standards.
 This Companion, while concise and austere by 
design, partakes of the richness of the scholarly debate 
built around European private law over the last two de-
cades. The word ‘politics’ appears sparingly in the book, 
but strong opinions run through text and subtext of the 
contributions. At least four different loci of disagreement 
are apt to polarize the discussion. 
 First, the politics of federalism: in the legal tra-
dition of continental Europe, a centralized private law 
regime is as essential to sovereign unity as a common 
flag or currency; on the other hand, it is not clear that 
the production of EU-based private law finds adequate 
legal basis in the EU Treaty; and in so far as national 
culture is tied to private law making, full harmonization 
might be neither possible nor desirable.  
 Second, the question of democratic input and 
institutional competence: what role for national legisla-
tors in a process of harmonization dominated by the 
Commission, by neo-corporatist bodies and by a closely 
knit academic network?  And what role for courts, do-
mestic and European, in the development of EU-made 
private law? 
 Third, the issue of distributive justice: all agree 
that European Union private law performs a regulatory 
function, but opinions range widely when it comes to 
deciding whether and how far to protect weaker par-
ties against abuses of private autonomy, or to which 
extent to accommodate environmental, cultural and 
socio-economic concerns in the interstices of private 
law rules.  
 Fourth, the relevance of internal coherence in 
private law regimes: to some, making private law at 
the EU level endangers the fundamental taxonomies 
of member-state legal systems; to others, the ongoing 
disintegration seems unavoidable, the added layer of 
complexity manageable, and the new possibilities ex-
citing. Attentive readers will recognize these themes in 
each contribution, no matter how technically phrased 
or buried under detail.  
 In line with German private law tradition, the 
book begins with contributions that are meant to be 
general and theoretical; the second half of the volume 
is instead focused on different branches of private law 
harmonization (contracts, torts, property, competition, 
and narrower subjects such as travel law). As a matter of 
fact, large questions of taxonomy, purpose and political 
impact are nicely sprinkled throughout the book, and 
the promised partition between general and special 
contributions is hardly visible. The book must therefore 
be read as a whole – a task made possible by the clear 
and engaging prose of all the contributors and by the 
relative brevity of the volume. 
 Diligent readers will be rewarded by the rich-
ness of the resulting picture, but they will have by no 
means exhausted the field (the further reading section 
is an essential part of the volume). European Union 
private law has outgrown its infancy, but it has certainly 
not achieved maturity, and no book at this stage can 
keep up with the ongoing changes in this realm. The 
Commission’s green paper of July 1st 2010, building 
upon extensive academic work, points at several pos-
sibilities for development, which may change the status 
of European private law in the near future. Choices 
must and will be made in matters of process. Further 
harmonization may be pursued by binding laws or with 
optional instruments, sector by sector or via horizon-
tal measures, by progressive accrual of grass-root 
practices or by centralized command. Substantively, 
multiple directions are on the table as well.  Given these 
vagaries, the private law of the European Union may 
soon need new companions. 
Daniela Caruso, Boston Unversity
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